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Abstract 
We examine implications of emigration of unskilled workers for quality of a skill-based good 
exported by a small open economy. This issue is relevant in the context of quality constraint 
faced by the developing countries like China and India, in promoting their exports, on the one 
hand, and significantly large emigrations of workers, particularly unskilled workers, that lower 
their productive capacities, on the other hand. We show that even though unskilled workers are 
not directly used in production of the quality-differentiated export good, their emigration would 
lower export quality when quality upgrading requires more intensive use of skilled workers 
relative to capital. This result follows from the complementarity between skilled and unskilled 
wages in a competitive general equilibrium model. A quality-content production subsidy in such 
a case can mitigate the adverse effect of emigration. Significantly large remittances received 
from unskilled emigrants create scope for taxing such remittances to finance the subsidy. 
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Introduction 
 
With an increasing number of countries globalizing during the last two decades in particular, 
there has been not only a surge in international exchange of commodities but also in factor 
movements and financial flows. Available data from different sources, such as Global Migration 
Data Portal, International Labour Organisation database, World Bank databank, and OECD 
migration data, reveal emigration of a large number of workers every year, both skilled as well as 
the unskilled labour type, largely from developing countries like Brazil, China and India to the 
developed countries. Such emigrations are driven by a host of push and pull factors including the 
wage differentials between the destination and origin countries. Despite the fact that this opens a 
source of national income in the form of remittances from these emigrated workers, the direct 
and immediate loss from such factor outflow is that it lowers the productive capacity of the 
economy since a sizeable proportion of its workforce now work abroad. The concern takes a 
more serious look if emigration of skilled workers compounds the problem of poor quality of 
goods exported by the less developed and developing countries. Many recent studies reveal that 
quality is an important factor for better export growth in developed-country markets (Sutton 
[2001], Hallak [2006], Baldwin and Harrigan [2011], Manova and Zhang [2012]).  
 
On the other hand, a sizeable and growing  empirical literature has observed robust evidences on 
the intensive use of domestic inputs like skilled labour and/or capital in producing higher quality 
export goods, in contrast to quality upgrading requiring higher intensive use of high-quality 
imported input (Brambilla et al. [2012], Brambilla et al. [2014], Brambilla and Porto [2016]). In 
such a context, for developing countries that experience growth of their exports being severely 
constrained by poor qualities of goods they export, allowing for emigration of skilled labour may 
actually worsen the situation further. The argument is pretty straightforward. A ceteris paribus 
outflow of skilled labour from the developing  countries due to higher skilled wage abroad (the 
pull factor of emigration) would generate a scarcity of skilled workers there, which would push 
up  the  skilled wage. To the extent quality upgrading requires more intensive use of skilled 
labour, this will increase the marginal cost of raising quality and induce producers to downgrade 
export quality. Low quality will lower marginal willingness to pay for such exports thus sinking 
export promotion prospects of the country further.  
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A counter argument is that emigration of skilled labour has a positive impact on export 
promotion through networking, which is essentially a demand side explanation (Ehrhart et. al. 
[2014]). Migration would reduce transaction costs associated with trade and serve to complement 
trade. 1 Erhart et al. have estimated such effects for the origin country in the context of Africa 
(effect of African migrants on African exports). Similarly, Rauch and Trindade (2002) and 
Felbermayr et al. (2011) found that the Chinese network increased its bilateral trade with the host 
country. Contrary to this pro-trade effect of migrants, Parsons (2012) found that migration 
promoted only the northern exports to the South.  
 
Two comments are warranted at this point. First, these pro-trade effects work mainly through 
employing immigrants in trade in the host country (in contrast to employing them in production 
of traded goods, which has a cost reducing and corresponding export promoting effect for the 
host country): Immigrants employed in trade can reduce the transaction cost of international 
trade – imports by the host country in this instance -- by their knowledge of language, customs, 
and laws to conduct business with their country of birth or with similar countries (see Genc et al. 
[2011]). Second, such effects are stronger for differentiated products than homogeneous 
products. In our context of migration affecting quality of exports (gains at the extensive margin), 
this networking effect may be relevant in cases such as Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem under 
asymmetric information of foreign buyers.2 However, for search goods, i.e. goods with 
observable quality, the cost effect of emigration might seem more relevant than the demand 
effect through networking. That is, where there is no problem of quality uncertainty and 
domestic factor costs (and the state of technology) are the important determinants of export 
quality, it might be imperative that emigration of skilled labour would lower export quality and 
thus regulating emigration may actually help promote exports at the extensive margin.  
In contrast, emigration of unskilled labour, which is not directly used in quality upgrading, might 
appear to be a more innocuous factor flow that a country can allow for. But trade literature often 
talks about complementarity between wages of different skill types. For example, Jones and 
Marjit (1992) and Marjit and Beladi (1998) have established a complementary between 
                                                          
1
 Exports of the native/origin country can also be augmented by emigration due to migrants’ preferences for goods 
from their country of origin, the “home preference effect” (Rauch and Casella [2003]). 
2
 See Bond (1984), Chiang and Masson (1989) and Acharyya (2005) for discussion on trade and export promotion 
under quality uncertainty and related problem of information externality. 
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movements in skilled and unskilled wages for a small country with a diversified trade pattern in 
the context of trade liberalisation. A more recent theoretical study by Acharyya, Beladi and Kar 
(2019) got similar results where they showed that with an exogenous increase in emigration 
rates, both types of wages at the equilibrium would rise.  They used this complementarity 
relationship to show that emigration of skilled workers would lower incentives for unskilled 
workers to emigrate, and vice versa, regardless of whether the costs of emigration rise or fall 
with the flow of emigration. What all these analyses point at is that emigration of skilled and 
unskilled labour may have symmetric effects on skilled and unskilled wages. Hence, even a 
seemingly innocuous emigration of unskilled labour can have far reaching adverse implications 
for export quality upgrading and thus on export prospects through consequent increase in the 
skilled wage. This is what this paper is concerned about.   
 
There are also theoretical studies such as those by Michael (2011) and Marjit et al. (2019) that 
talk about immigration of unskilled labour raising the skilled wage in the host country. In 
Michael (2011) this happens when skilled and unskilled labour are complementary to each other 
in production. In the context of a household sector, Marjit et al (2019), on the other hand, 
demonstrates that net skilled wage rate rises due to unskilled immigration even though the skilled 
wage rate falls. Even though these analyses talk about asymmetric effect of unskilled labour 
immigration on skilled and unskilled wages, what is apparent is that such  immigration  would 
still affect the choice of quality of exports goods (in the host country), albeit differently than 
when wage movements are symmetric, in production of which unskilled workers are not directly 
used. However, these theoretical analyses and most of the empirical studies focus on 
immigration of unskilled workers on welfare and skilled wage for the host country. Our focus, in 
contrast, is on the effect of emigration of unskilled labour on export quality and, therefore, on 
export prospects of the native or origin country.  This shift in focus from the host to the origin 
country in exploring how emigration may affect exports of the origin country, is similar to 
Ehrhart et. al. (2014).  As spelled earlier, since exports of developing countries, from which 
unskilled workers emigrate in large numbers, are constrained by their low qualities, it is 
worthwhile to address implications of emigration of unskilled workers on quality of exports of 
the origin country.  
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As we will demonstrate, emigration of unskilled workers may have adverse effects on export-
quality, and in such cases policy regulations in the origin country restricting emigration of 
unskilled workers may seem to be a natural conclusion. But, such a policy regulation especially 
for a developing origin country may not be warranted for two reasons.3 First, emigration 
provides gainful employment to emigrants who would otherwise have been absorbed in the low 
wage informal sector of the unskilled labour market or even worse, remained unemployed.  
Second, if there is no open unemployment in the origin country, then emigration by raising the 
unskilled wage would raise the standard of living of those workers who are left behind. In such a 
situation, a potential policy conflict emerges between allowing for emigration of unskilled 
workers on the one hand, and promoting exports through incentivizing quality upgrading, on the 
other hand. This policy dilemma may, however, be resolved by mitigating the adverse effect of 
emigration through a quality-content production subsidy to producers of the quality 
differentiated export good. And large inflow of remittances received by developing countries like 
China and India creates scope for financing the production subsidy by taxing such remittances.4  
 
A quality-content production subsidy given to the producers of skill-based exports would raise 
the effective marginal revenue from raising quality and thus directly incentivize quality 
upgrading. At the same time, expansion of scale of production of the export good induced by the 
production subsidy will raise the demand for skilled workers and consequently push up their 
wages. Thus, the positive effect of a subsidy inducing export-quality upgrading and resolving the 
policy conflict though is quite plausible, yet is not a foregone conclusion and hence is 
worthwhile to examine. This policy issue is the second major concern of this paper. For the 
purpose, we consider a situation where the rate of emigration rises, ceteris paribus, due to, say, 
an external shock abroad such as an exogenous rise in the foreign unskilled wage (the pull factor 
of emigration). For any given tax rate, such an increase in the rate of emigration of unskilled 
workers would  increase the total remittances received, which in turn would finance a higher rate 
of subsidy.  
                                                          
3That restrictions on emigration of unskilled workers by the developing countries may not be desirable policy option 
in the developing countries are often reflected in their push for mode 4 provisions of GATS in WTO ministerial 
rounds of talks. 
4
 Latest available date from the World Bank indicates that remittances have surged from $20 billion in 2004 to $70 
billion for China and $80 billion for India in 2018.   
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We analyse these issues theoretically by adopting the Gruen-Corden (1970) variant of a general 
equilibrium structure of a small open economy with a quality-differentiated export good and a set 
of homogeneous traded goods displaying diverse trade pattern, similar to Acharyya and Jones 
(2001).5 The small open economy under consideration produces three goods: a skill-based 
quality differentiated export good, a homogeneous export good and a homogeneous import 
competing good. The homogeneous export good is an agricultural commodity that uses land 
along with unskilled labour. On the other hand, the import competing good is a manufacturing 
good that uses unskilled labour and capital which is also shared by the skill-based quality-
differentiated export good. In such a set up with the quality differentiated export good not 
domestically consumed in the benchmark case, we establish the following results. First, an 
exogenous increase in the rate of emigration of unskilled workers may downgrade export quality 
depending upon the technological requirement of whether higher qualities are relatively more 
capital intensive or skill intensive. Second, a quality content production subsidy financed by tax 
on remittance may mitigate the adverse effect of emigration on quality if the initial rate of 
subsidy is greater than a critical value as defined later. Finally, when emigration rates are 
endogenous, emigration of unskilled workers caused by an external shock is magnified through 
consequent quality variations.  The quality variation, upgrading or downgrading as the case may 
be depending on the relative skill intensity of higher qualities of the export good, is larger as well 
than that due to an exogenous increase in the rate of unskilled emigration.  
 
Our paper also contributes to the trade literature that debates over whether commodity and factor 
trades are substitutes or complements. The celebrated Factor Price Equalization theorem 
(Samuelson [1941]) and Goods Price Equalization theorem (Mundell [1950]) demonstrated that 
when factor endowments of trading nations are not significantly different from each other, and 
they share the same technology for producing the traded goods, commodity and factor trades are 
mutually exclusive (substitute result). However, identical technology across countries is not a 
reasonable approximation of the real world, particularly in the context of North-South trade. This 
seems to be a major reason for why do we observe coexistence of both commodity and factor 
trades. In such a context, trade theorists have subsequently re-examined the issue as to whether 
                                                          
5Ours, however, is a more generalized version in terms of the production structure. 
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factor flows augment or lower trade volumes. Svensson (1982) and Markusen (1983), for 
example, found a complementary relationship. Krugman’s (1979) love of variety approach to 
intra-industry trade also has a built-in complemenatrity relationship though at the extensive 
margin: labour immigration increases number of varieties produced and exported. In a more 
recent paper, Dutta, Kar and Marjit (2013) have studied the impact of emigration on product 
variety and wage inequality under oligopolistic market structure. In extending this strand of 
literature, we focus on the relationship between emigration of unskilled workers and export 
promotion through quality upgrading. Our result shows that we may have both complementarity 
result (when quality is upgraded) and a substitute result (when quality is downgraded) depending 
on the production technology. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the production structure of 
our small open economy and examine the effect of an exogenous rise in rate of emigration on the 
equilibrium level of export quality. Section 3 discusses how a quality content production subsidy 
financed out of tax on remittances can mitigate adverse effect of emigration. In Section 4 we 
discuss implications of causality between export quality and emigration after endogeneising the 
rate of emigration. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Exogenous emigration and export quality 
2.1 The Economy 
Consider a small open economy producing three goods: a skill-based export good Z, whose 
quality is observable to all and is indexed by Q   [0, 1]; a homogeneous agricultural export good 
X and a homogeneous manufacturing import-competing good Y. The homogeneous export and 
import-competing goods are produced by unskilled labour (L) along with sector-specific land (T) 
and capital (K) respectively. The quality-differentiated export good uses the same capital K as 
the import-competing good. World prices of all these goods WjP , j = X, Y and Z, are 
exogenously given, though the price of good Z is higher for a higher quality of it that reflects 
higher marginal willingness to pay for higher qualities by foreign consumers. More precisely, 
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)(QPP WZWZ  , 0)(  QPWZ , 0)(  QPWZ . On the cost side, higher quality of good Z requires 
intensive use of both skilled labour (S) and capital (K):  
                 
0)(,0)(),(  QaQaQaa hZhZhZhZ ,h = S, K                     (1) 
where, hZa  denote the per unit requirement of input-h. Note that in (1) we assume hZa to be fixed 
for any given quality choice, but increasing at an increasing rate with the quality level. Though 
both skilled labour and capital per unit of output of good Z are higher for a higher quality of it, 
the  relative skill intensity, )(/)( QaQas KZSZZ  , varies as per the technological requirement. 
More precisely, 
                    
 Qs KZSZZ ˆˆ  
 
where, )(
)(
Qa
QaQ
iZ
iZ
hZ
  , h = S,K, are the quality elasticities of the per unit input requirement and 
are positive and hat over Zs denotes its proportional change, i.e. 
Z
Z
Z
s
ds
s ˆ . Thus, quality 
upgrading is relatively more skill intensive if KZSZ   , and more capital intensive otherwise. As 
we will see, this will be an important determinant of the effect of emigration and tax on 
remittances on quality choice.  
           
Due to free entry in the three sectors, producers everywhere earn zero supernormal profits, so 
that in each sector the world price equals average costs:  
RawaP TXLX
W
X 
                                                      (2) 
rawaP KYLY
W
Y 
                                                       (3) 
SSZKZ
W
Z wQarQaQP )()()( 
                                     (4) 
where, Sw  is the skilled wage, w is the unskilled wage, R is the rate of return to land, r is the rate 
of return to capital, and ija , i = L, K, T; j = X, Y, denote the per unit requirement of input-i in 
production of good-j. These aijs are essentially the least-cost choices made by the producers that 
depend only on the relevant factor price ratios under the assumption of CRS technology:  
         
)/( Rwaa iXiX  ,
 
)/( rwaa iYiY 
                                             
(5) 
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Profit maximizing export quality Q0 is the one for which the marginal revenue from quality 
upgrading equals the marginal cost of quality upgrading: 
SSZKZ
W
Z wQarQaQP )()()( 000 
                                            
(6) 
We close the model by the following full employment conditions, which are ensured by 
flexibility in the rate of return to capital and land, unskilled wage and skilled wage along with 
competitive market forces: 
            
ZQaS SZ )()1(                                                                   (7)
 
            
YaXaL LYLX  )1( 
                                                        
(8) 
             
XaT TX
                                                                               
(9)
 
            
YaZQaK KYKZ  )(
                                                              
(10)
 
where,  and  are the proportions of skilled and unskilled workers respectively who emigrate 
abroad. In this section, we consider these rates as exogenously given, and shall draw implications 
of endogenously determined emigration rates in the last section.   
 
Given the exogenous rates of emigrations, the equation system (2) – (10) comprising twelve 
equations determine the twelve variables: skilled and unskilled money wages, rates of return to 
capital and land, the quality level of the export good Z, four input coefficients in X and Y 
sectors, and the three output levels. Before proceeding further, a few properties of our small open 
economy deserves attention. First, the (X, Y) nugget displays a specific-factor production 
structure a la Jones (1971), so that the wages and rates of returns to sector-specific capital and 
land depend on the availability of these factors of production for this nugget. Since, given the 
endowment levels -- TKL ,, -- availability of these factors for production of X and Y depend on 
the rates of emigration,  and  , and the quality level of the export good Z, so factor returns are 
contingent upon emigration rates and export quality level. An (endogenous) increase in export 
quality, for example, will change the capital requirement to produce good Z, and consequently 
change capital availability for production of the import competing good. This in turn will affect 
the unskilled money wage and rate of returns to capital and land through change in the 
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composition of output levels in the (X, Y) nugget and consequent changes in relative demand for 
unskilled labour. 
     
Second, skilled and unskilled wages are complementary to each other in the sense that an 
increase in unskilled money wage, say caused by emigration of unskilled workers, will lower the 
rates of return to capital and land (see eq. (2) and (3)), and the fall in r will raise the skilled wage 
at any given quality of good Z (see eq. (4)). Similarly, any policy shock or exogenous change 
that causes skilled wage to rise, will lower the rate of return to capital used by Z (and Y), which 
in turn will raise the unskilled money wage. This complementary relationship has been similar to 
Margit and Beladi (1999) and Acharyya et al. (2019) and is stated more precisely in the 
following Lemma:  
 
Lemma 1:  Any exogenous shock that raises (or lowers) unskilled money wage, will raise (or 
lower) skilled money wage and lower rates of returns to capital and land. 
Proof: By (2) and (3), we get respectively wr
KY
LY ˆˆ 
  and wR
TX
LX ˆˆ 
 . Using this, by (4) and 
(6) we obtain, 
               
ww
KY
LY
SZ
KZ
S ˆˆ 


                                                   (11)  
where, ij , i = S, K, L, j = Z, Y, is the share of factor-i in average total cost of producing good j. 
Hence, proved. □ 
 
Thus, from Lemma 1 and the marginal condition (6), it follows that an  increase in unskilled 
money wage will affect the choice of quality of the export good Z. However, the causality is not 
unidirectional. Rather, as it follows from the above discussions, the export quality and unskilled 
wage are inter-dependent, causing each other, and thus are to be determined simultaneously. To 
fix ideas, first note that by the zero-profit condition for good Z, for any given quality Q, the rate 
of return to capital and skilled money wage varies inversely due to any policy shock. Thus, by 
the marginal condition (6), producers will respond to a policy shock that raises the skilled money 
wage by downgrading quality if higher quality of good Z is more skill intensive ( KZSZ   ): 
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SKZSZSZ
W
Z wQ
PQ ˆ)(ˆ 2                                                  (12) 
where, 0)()()( 

  QarQawQeP KZSZSWZ by the second order condition for profit 
maximization. 
 
Using (11), we can rewrite (12) indicating how an increase in unskilled money wage (due to 
some policy shock) affects the profit-maximizing quality of the export good Z: 
                     
wQ
PQ KZSZ
KY
LY
W
Z
KZ ˆ)(ˆ 2 

                                       (13) 
In Figure 1, this relationship is represented by the QQ curve, which is negatively sloped if 
KZSZ   , and positively sloped otherwise. 
          
The other relationship in Figure 1, the ww curve, represents the relationship between export 
quality and the unskilled money wage consistent with full employment of all factors of 
production. An increase in export quality requires more skilled labour per unit of output of good 
Z. Since skilled workers are specific to this sector, so this necessitates a fall in the output of good 
Z, and correspondingly lowers the demand for capital by SZ  at the margin. But, higher quality 
also requires additional capital at the rate KZ per unit of good Z. Hence, if KZSZ   , net capital 
requirement in Z production falls as its quality is raised. The release of capital enables a scale 
expansion of the import-competing good Y, which in turn requires additional unskilled workers 
as well. Given the rate of emigration, since unskilled workers are already fully employed, 
increase in demand for such workers raises their wage. If, on the other hand, KZSZ   , by a 
reverse logic, a rise in export quality lowers the unskilled money wage. Algebraically, this can be 
verified from the following (see appendix),  
              
QwA SZKZKZ
KY
LY ˆ)(ˆ 
                                                     (14) 
where, 
KY
Y
TXLY
LX
XA 
 1 ; j , j = X, Y, is the factor substitution elasticity in sector j; and 
Lj is the share of sector-j in total employment of unskilled workers. 
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The equilibrium quality of the export good Q0 and the unskilled money wage w0 are thus 
determined simultaneously corresponding to the point of intersection between QQ and ww 
curves. The rest of the variables are determined from the zero profit and full employment 
conditions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Equilibrium Export Quality and Unskilled Wage 
 
2.2 Exogenous increase in emigration rates and export quality 
In the above set up, consider an exogenous increase in emigration rate of unskilled workers. By 
the stroke of the pen, this raises the unskilled wage due to consequent fall in the availability of 
them for domestic production of homogeneous traded goods, X and Y. By Lemma 1, the 
increase in unskilled emigration rate will raise the skilled wage and lower rates of return to 
capital and land. Thus, emigration of unskilled workers will raise quality of the export good Z if 
its higher quality is relatively capital intensive, KZKZ   , and lowers export quality otherwise. 
In Figure 2, as emigration of unskilled workers raises unskilled wage at the initial quality of 
good Z, the ww curve shifts up along the QQ curve and at the new equilibrium quality is 
upgraded if KZKZ   and downgraded if KZSZ   . Algebraically: 
         


 ˆ)(
1ˆ
2 SZKZ
KY
LY
W
Z
KZ Q
PQ                                            (15) 
where, 0)( 22 

  AQ
P
SZKZ
KY
LY
KY
LY
W
Z
KZKZ 



  and 
  1
.
.  
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Hence, 
Proposition 1: Emigration of unskilled workers leads to quality degrading if KZSZ   . 
Proof: Follows from the above discussion. For algebraic details, see appendix. ฀ 
     
 
Figure 2: Emigration, Export Quality and Unskilled Wage 
 
Note that, in either case, the initial rise in the unskilled wage due to emigration is dampened to 
some extent by variations in quality. This follows from the reallocation of capital across Z and Y 
sectors due to quality upgrading or downgrading, and consequent symmetric changes in the 
demand for unskilled workers.  Quality is upgraded if KZSZ   , and, as spelled out earlier, under 
the same condition, the overall capital requirement in Z production rises. The reverse reasoning 
shows that if KZSZ   , as emigration downgrades export quality and correspondingly raises the 
scale of production of good Z, larger capital requirement due to scale expansion dominates 
smaller capital requirement per unit due to quality degradation. Thus, in either case, whether 
quality is upgraded or downgraded, the overall capital requirement in Z sector rises. Since, the 
import-competing sector uses this capital as well, so its production must fall as a consequence of 
emigration induced quality variation, which in turn lowers the demand for unskilled labour and 
lowers the unskilled wage to some extent.  Algebraically this can be verified from the following 
expression (see appendix), 
                 
0ˆ)(ˆ  QK SZKZZ 
                                                   
(16) 
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This result is summarized in the following Lemma 2: 
Lemma 2: Unskilled emigration induced quality variation lowers unskilled money wage and 
thereby dampens the initial rise in the unskilled wage to some extent.  
Proof: Follows from (16) and QY SZKZ
KY
KZ ˆ)(ˆ 
  . ฀ 
As we will elaborate in Section 4, this result has some far reaching implications for emigration of 
workers. 
 
An exogenous increase in the rate of emigration of skilled workers will have similar effects on 
wages and rates of returns to capital and land. Such emigration will raise the skilled wage due to 
scarcity of skilled workers as lesser number of them will now be available for production of good 
Z. Consequent fall in production of good Z, at the initial level of quality, will deploy some 
capital in this sector which will lower its rate of return. Lower capital cost of producing the 
import-competing good Y that uses the same capital, on the other hand, will expand its 
production and raise the demand for unskilled workers and their wages. Thus, again the ww 
curve will shift upward as in Figure 3 and the export quality will rise or fall according as 
KZKZ    or KZSZ   . 
 
Therefore, emigration of either type will have similar effect on the choice of export quality, and 
this result follows from the complementarity between skilled and unskilled money wages as 
stated in Lemma 1.  
 
3. Remittance Tax and Production Subsidy 
Proposition 1 indicates a potential policy conflict when higher quality of the export good Z is 
relatively skill intensive: allowing emigration of unskilled workers on the one hand, and 
promoting exports by incentivizing quality upgrading on the other hand. But, though emigration 
of unskilled workers may have adverse effect on export-quality, restricting such emigration by 
the developing countries may be difficult for reasons mentioned earlier.   Instead, the adverse 
effect of emigration can be mitigated through a production subsidy given to producers of the 
quality differentiated export good Z. A uniform subsidy  will not, however, incentivise quality 
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upgrading. Rather, it will lower quality by raising the skilled wage and consequently the 
marginal cost of quality upgrading. A production subsidy that is higher for higher quality of good 
Z would be required. To fix ideas, suppose, a per unit subsidy at the rate bthat increases with 
quality upgrading at an increasing rate, is provided to the producers of good Z 
]1,0[
2
1)( 2  QbQQ
 , b > 0                                                       (17) 
This subsidy can be financed, among the several alternatives, by revenue collected by taxing the 
remittance sent by unskilled emigrants: 
ZbQLwR 2*
2
1
                                                                      (18) 
where,  is the rate of remittance-tax, w* is the unskilled money wage in the host country, and 
 is the proportion of income remitted by an emigrant.  
 
The zero profit condition and the marginal condition for the skill based export good under 
quality-content production subsidy now changes to, 
rQawQabQQP KZSSZWZ )()(2
1)( 2 
                                               (19) 
rQawQabQQP KZSSZWZ )()()(                                                     (20) 
It is immediate that a production subsidy will raise the demand for both skilled workers and 
capital, and skilled labour being specific to this sector, its larger demand would raise its wage 
unambiguously. Thus, at initial w and r, this will act as a disincentive for quality upgrading as 
the marginal cost of quality will rise unambiguously. To be precise, the skilled wage would vary 
with the rate of subsidy per unit of quality as follows: 
                
bw
SZ
Z
S
ˆˆ 
                                                                                 (21) 
where, W
Z
Z P
bQ
2
2
 is the per unit subsidy as a proportion to the unit production cost. From the 
marginal condition (20) then, given (21) and at initial w and r, the change in the quality level due 
to an increase in the rate of subsidy can be obtained as, 
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bbQ SZ ˆ)2(2
ˆ                                                            (22) 
That is, a quality-content production subsidy will raise export quality conditionally. More precise 
statement is made in the following Lemma: 
Lemma 3: Quality-content production subsidy is worthwhile if SZ < 2. 
Proof:  By (22), given that  < 0 by the second order condition for profit maximization, an 
increase in the rate of production subsidy will raise export quality if 2SZ . □ 
 
A one percent increase in the rate of subsidy raises the effective marginal revenue from quality 
upgrading by one percent. On the other hand, by the quadratic form of the subsidy function, a 
one percent rise in the rate of production subsidy raises the marginal cost of quality upgrading 
due to consequent increase in the skilled wage by 
2
SZ percent. Hence, the quality content 
production subsidy raises the marginal revenue from quality upgrading more than the marginal 
cost if SZ < 2, and thereby incentivizes producers to raise quality.  
 
By Lemma 3, as a quality-content production subsidy raises export quality for any level of 
unskilled wages, so the QQ curve in Figure 3 will also shift to the right as a consequence 
emigration of unskilled workers. Note that, for any given remittance-tax rate, an exogenous 
increase in the rate of emigration will generate larger remittances and hence larger remittance-tax 
revenue. This will enable the local government to finance a proportionately higher rate of 
quality-content production subsidy at the initial level of quality.  If the consequent quality 
increase is large enough, it can outweigh the adverse effect of emigration. This is shown in 
Figure 3 by a larger shift of the QQ curve to the right than the (leftward) shift of the ww curve. 
As shown in the appendix, this will be the case if the initial rate of production subsidy was larger 
than a critical value:  
         
2)2())(2(
2~
 SZKYKZLYKZSZSZ
KYbb 

                    (23) 
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Figure 4: Quality-content production subsidy 
Thus, given the above condition, even when KZSZ   , emigration of unskilled workers can 
upgrade export quality if a quality-content production subsidy is given to the producers of Z, 
which is financed by taxes on remittances. Note that even when the initial rate of subsidy is 
lower than the critical rate defined in (23) above, the adverse effect of emigration can be 
dampened to some extent through remittance-tax financed production subsidy. 
 
4. Endogenous Emigration and Export Quality 
From Lemma 2 it appears that if we allow for endogeneity of emigration with the rate of 
emigration responding to both the source country factors (push factors) and the host or 
destination country factors (pull factors), then quality variations due to any policy or exogenous 
shock will cause the rate of emigration to change as well. That is, emigration and export quality 
will cause each other and thus are to be determined simultaneously. In this section, we see 
whether and how such endogeneity and two-way causality alter our results stated in Proposition 
1. According to Acharyya et al. (2019), the decision to emigrate is an endogenous function of the 
wage differentials across the two countries and the costs associated to emigration. Assuming 
costs of migration to be negligible, as it is not the primary focus of this analysis, emigration of 
either skilled or unskilled labour will be driven entirely by the wage differentials. Let w* 
and *Sw denote, respectively, unskilled wage and skilled wage at the destination country. So an 
unskilled (skilled) worker will emigrate if )( ** Sww exceeds )( Sww that she would have earned in 
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the source country. Otherwise, he will stay back. So, given Lemma 2, the emigration equilibrium 
conditions can be written as: 
           
*),( wQw 
                                                                       (24) 
           
*),( SS wQw                                                                       (25) 
In the above, we equate the gain from migration (the right hand side) to its opportunity cost 
which is the domestic wages forgone.  To ensure that the emigration equilibrium exists and is 
unique, it must be that, *),0( wQw  and *),0( SS wQw  ]1,0[Q . Since we have established 
above that either type of labour emigration has the same impact on the factor prices in the source 
country, let us focus on unskilled emigration for our endogeneity analysis. Note that by the small 
country assumption, any change in rates of emigration from the source country will have 
negligible effect on the world wage rates. So in the ),( w plane, the right hand side of (24) will 
be a horizontal line at some fixed value of *w . On the other hand, a ceteris paribus rise in 
emigration will raise wages at the source, such that the wage differential for each type decreases 
with the rate of emigration. Therefore, the incentive for emigration based on wage differential 
decreases with the rate of emigration itself. So the left hand side of (24) will be a positively 
sloped line which we denote as the ww schedule and its intersection with the *w line will give the 
initial equilibrium value of 0  .  
Now following the discussion in section 2.2, a ceteris paribus rise in export quality say from 
10 QtoQ will lower the domestic unskilled wage when higher qualities are relatively more capital 
intensive, and will raise the unskilled wage otherwise. This is also evident from (14). The fall in 
domestic wage, when SZKZ   , incentivises more workers to emigrate. The ww  line shifts to 
the right and we have a higher value of  corresponding to a higher quality of good 
Z: )()( 0011 QQ   . In the alternative case, i.e. when KZSZ   , a rise in quality raises the 
domestic unskilled wage and induces lesser out-migration of workers. So ww line shifts left and 
 falls: )()( 0011 QQ   . The two panels of Figure 4 depict the above two cases respectively: 
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Figure 4: Determination of )(Q schedule 
 
From this emerges a relationship between the level of export quality and the rate of emigration. 
In Figure 5, this relationship is represented by the )(Q curve. From the emigration equilibrium 
condition (24), it can be shown (see appendix) that )(Q is negatively sloped if KZSZ   , and 
positively sloped otherwise: 
Qw
Q
w
dQ
d
KY
SZKZKZLY
MM




 )( 




                                             (26) 
The other side of the two-way causation, i.e. how a ceteris paribus change in rate of emigration 
of unskilled labour affects the level of export quality chosen, has already been derived in Section 
2.2 and stated in Proposition 1. To recall, an exogenous increase in emigration rate of unskilled 
workers raises raises quality of the export good Z if its higher quality is relatively capital 
intensive, KZKZ   , and lowers export quality otherwise. This relationship between Q and 
 where the causation is now from the latter to the former is depicted in Figure 5 by the 
)(Q schedule. Algebraically, this can be verified from the slope of )(Q  from (15): 
               
Q
Q
PdQ
d
SZKZ
KY
LY
W
Z
KZ
QQ





)(2 

                                      
(27) 
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Given these two relationships, equilibrium rate of emigration and export quality are determined 
at the intersection of )(Q and )(Q schedules at point E in Figure 5.6  
 
Now consider a ceteris paribus rise in the destination country unskilled wage rate )0ˆ( * w . As a 
pull factor of migration, at the stroke of the pen, this will induce a greater rate of emigration of 
unskilled workers from the source country. This is captured by an upward shift of the *w line 
whose intersection with the initial ww curve (in Figure 4) gives us a higher value of  . Note that 
this change in  occurs at the initial level of quality and is also independent of the relative skill 
intensity of higher quality varieties of Z. So this will be reflected through an upward shift of 
the )(Q schedule along the )(Q line in Figure 5. While the rate of emigration rises 
unconditionally, export quality will rise if higher qualities are relatively more capital intensive 
and fall otherwise, as in the case of exogenously given emigration rates.  
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of rise in *w on  and Q 
 
The most important thing to note here is that a change in rate of emigration affecting the level of 
export quality does not end the story. This means that the overall changes that the two variables 
                                                          
6Note that by stability requirements, )(Q schedule must be steeper than )(Q schedule. 
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go through are not one shot. To explain further, consider the case when higher qualities are 
relatively more capital intensive (the left hand side panel in Figure 5). Increased emigration of 
unskilled workers in response to higher wages in the destination country raises unskilled wage in 
home country, lowers the rate of return to capital and raises the skilled wage. This will induce 
producers of Z to upgrade export quality. Higher level of quality raises capital requirement in Z 
sector and the consequent change in composition of output in the (X, Y) nugget dampens the 
initial rise in w. More workers will emigrate as a consequence of export quality being upgraded. 
This leads to a second round rise in value of  . Once again this will change the domestic factor 
prices in such a way that given the relative skill intensity ranking of higher quality varieties, 
quality will again be upgraded. In this way, rounds of feedback effects of one variable on the 
other will continue, the magnitude of changes in both  and Q petering out with every successive 
rounds until the new equilibrium values of the two variables are reached at the intersection 
of )(Q and the shifted up dotted )(Q .  At the end, there will be even larger rate of emigration 
than was initially caused by the increase in the unskilled wage in the host country, and a larger 
rise in export quality than an increase in the exogenously given emigration rate would have led 
to. By similar logic, when SZKZ   , the fall in export quality will be magnified by multiplier 
expansion in the rate of emigration. All these are summarized in Proposition 2 below: 
 
Proposition 2: Quality variations are magnified when emigration of unskilled workers is 
endogenous. 
 
Proof: Follows from the above discussion. □ 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown that emigration of unskilled workers may adversely affect export 
prospects of a small open economy with a diversified export basket by downgrading quality of 
its skill-based export good. This would be the case when higher qualities are relatively more skill 
intensive. Similar result follows when skilled workers emigrate since skilled and unskilled wages 
are complementary. Such adverse effect, however, can be mitigated through a quality-content 
production subsidy financed by taxes on the remittances received from emigrants. Increase in the 
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rate of emigration will generate larger remittances and hence larger remittance-tax revenue 
enabling the local government to provide a larger quality-content production subsidy. 
 
The quality upgrading or downgrading, as the case may be, gets magnified when emigration rate 
is endogenous and increases due to a wage increase in the host country. The rate of emigration 
gets magnified as well by the consequent quality variation. 
 
Appendix 
A.1. Exogenous rise in rate of emigration 
A.1.1: Relation between quality and skilled wage. 
Total differentiation of the marginal condition (6) for quality choice as given in text yields,  
      
drQadQQardwQadQwQadQQP KZKZSSZSSZWZ )()()()()(   
SSZSKZSZSKZ
W
Z wQawrQardQQawQarQP ˆ)(ˆ)()()()( 

 
S
SZ
SZ
W
Z
W
Z
SSZ
KZ
KZ
W
Z
W
Z
KZ wQa
QaQ
Q
P
P
wQa
rQa
QaQ
Q
P
P
rQaQQ ˆ)(
)()(ˆ)(
)()(ˆ 

 

  
 SSZSZKZKZWZ wrQ
PQQ ˆˆˆ                                                                    (A1.1)               
From the zero profit condition in Z sector given by (5), at initial Q, proportional change in 
skilled wage is given by, S
KZ
SZ wr ˆˆ 
 . Substituting this in (A1.1) yields, 
SZKZ
S
SKZSZSZ
W
Z
SSZSZS
KZ
SZ
KZKZ
W
Z
when
dw
dQ
wQ
PQwwQ
PQQ






 



,,0
ˆ)(ˆˆˆˆ 2
      (A1.2) 
A.1.2: Determination of QQ schedule. 
Substituting ww
KY
LY
SZ
KZ
S ˆˆ 


 in (A1.2) we get the equation that relates change in quality to the 
rise in emigration induced change in domestic unskilled wage as: 
         
wQ
PQ KZSZKZ
KY
LY
W
Z ˆ)(ˆ 2 

                                                                       (A1.3) 
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A.1.2: Determination of ww schedule. 
Total differentiation of (10), (9) and (8) yields respectively, 
         
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(0ˆ QZaYK KZKZKYKY                                                           (A1.4) 
         
TXaX ˆˆ                                                                                                     (A1.5) 
     
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ LYLYLXLX aYaX                                                                   (A1.6) 
where 
  1 . 
Under the assumption that the rate of skilled emigration does not change, total differentiation of 
(7) yields,  
           QZ SZ ˆˆ 
                                                                                              (A1.7) 
Substituting (A1.7) in (A1.4) we get: 
           



  QaY SZKZ
KY
KZ
KY
ˆ)(ˆˆ 

                                                                 (A1.8) 
Substituting (A1.5) and (A1.8) in (A1.6) we get: 
       



  Qaaaa SZKZ
KY
KZ
KYLYLYTXLXLX
ˆ)(ˆˆ)ˆˆ(ˆ 

                            
(A1.9) 
Note that by the condition for least-cost choice of inputs we have (see Jones [1965]): 
         
)ˆˆ(ˆ
)ˆˆ(ˆˆˆˆˆ
Rwa
aaaaaaa
LXXTX
LXTXLXTXLXLXTXTXTXTX

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

 
where 
j
LjKj
j
rw
aa
ˆˆ
ˆˆ

 . LXaˆ and LYaˆ can be expressed similarly.   
We can rewrite (A1.9) using the above as: 
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(A1.10) 
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A.1.4: Proof of Proposition 1  
(A1.3) and (A1.10) constitute the system of equations (written below in matrix notation) to solve 
for changes in quality and unskilled money wage: 
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
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KZ Q
PQ 
                                                           
(A1.11)
 
where, 0)( 22 

  AQ
P
SZKZ
KY
LY
KY
LY
W
Z
KZKZ 



 . 
A.1.4: Proof of 0ˆ)(ˆ  QK SZKZZ   
Total capital requirement in the Z sector: ZQaQK KZZ )()(   
Using full employment condition for skilled labour as given in the text by (7), we can rewrite the 
above as: )(
)1()()( Qa
SQaQK
SZ
KZZ
 .  
With 0ˆ  , total differentiation of this gives us:  QQaQaQK SZKZSZKZZ ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ   . 
Substituting expression for change in quality as derived in (A1.11) in the above, we can prove 
that 0ˆ ZK irrespective of whether quality is raised or lowered: 


 ˆ)(
1ˆ 2
2 SZKZ
KY
LY
W
Z
KZZ Q
PK  which is positive for 0
ˆ 
.
 
 
A.2: Remittance tax and production subsidy:  
Condition under which quality content production subsidy will outweigh the adverse effect of 
emigration on quality choice: 
Total differentiating the new marginal condition as given in the text by (20) under quality 
content production subsidy case yields: 
        
drQadQQardwQadQwQaQdbbdQdQQP KZKZSSZSSZWZ )()()()()(   
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bbQwQawrQardQbQawQarQP SSZSKZSZSKZWZ ˆˆ)(ˆ)()()()( 
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(A2.1) 
From the zero profit condition in the Z sector we get:  
dQQawdwadrQadQQardbQQdQbdQQP SZSSSZKZKZWZ )()()(2
12
2
1)( 2 
 
Using the marginal condition reproduced below, 
     
rQawQabQQP KZSSZWZ )()()(   
the above expression boils down to: 
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Substituting wr
KY
LY ˆˆ 
 as can be derived from the zero profit condition of good Y, the above 
boils down to: 
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Substituting (A2.3) and wr
KY
LY ˆˆ 
  once again in (A2.1) we get: 
          
   bbwQ
PQ SZKZSZKZ
KY
LY
W
Z ˆ2
2
ˆˆ 2  


                                            
(A2.4) 
Total differentiation of )(2
1 2
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(A2.5) 
On the other hand, total differentiation of LwR *  yields  ˆˆˆ R ,
 
which by substituting in 
(A2.5), we get, 
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Substituting (A2.6) in (A2.4) and rearranging the terms we get the equation for the new QQ 
schedule as follows: 
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ˆˆ2
2
1 2
2 

 

  SZSZKZKZ
KY
LY
W
Z
SZ
b
wQ
PQb
      
(A2.7)
 
Finally, quality will go up if the magnitude of horizontal shift of this QQ curve for a rise in 
unskilled emigration 0ˆ  exceeds that of the ww schedule:          
          
 
  )(
ˆ
2
2
1
)ˆˆ(2
2
2 SZKZKZLY
KY
ww
SZ
SZ
QQ dQb
b
dQ 





 


 
At the initial tax rate, )0ˆ(  , rearranging the above we can get a critical value of bb ~ as given 
the text, for which 
wwQQ dQdQeiQ  ..0ˆ . Then 0ˆ,~  Qbb
 
 
A.3: Endogenous Emigration and Export Quality 
Derivation of slope of )(Q : 
Total differentiation of the unskilled migration equilibrium, *),( wQw  , we get: 
           
0* 

 dwdwdQQ
w                                                                     (A3.1) 
Now the effect of a change in quality on the unskilled money wage, given everything else, is 
nothing but the slope of the ww curve which has been derived in (A1.10) and restated as under: 
         
 0;ˆ)(ˆˆ AwhereQwA SZKZ
KY
KZLY 
  
AQ
w
KY
SZKZKZLY

 )( 

 
On the other hand, d
dw is the effect of a ceteris paribus change in rate of unskilled emigration on 
the unskilled wage, at initial level of quality, which again from (A1.10) can be derived as 
follows: 
A
w 
 

. Substituting these expressions back in (A3.1) will give us the slope of the 
unskilled migration equilibrium condition: 
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

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dQ
dd
A
dQ
A
dwdwdQQ
w
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